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Beyond Bathsheba: Managing Ethical Climates
Through Pragmatic Ethics
JOSEPH E. LONG
CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA, US

Abstract
This paper explores the puzzling nature of leader behavior
in order to understand the conditions that encourage
unethical decision-making. Building on the extant literature
of pragmatic ethics, I explore how leaders can increase the
quality of ethical decision-making within their organizations
by understanding the incentives of rational choice. I have
developed a rational choice-based ethical decision-making
model to understand the incentives behind ethical leader
behavior and find that ethical behavior is likely to be
rational as long as audience costs remain higher than the savings benefits incurred by
unethical behavior. I conclude with analysis of how the ethical rational model compares to
other prominent theories that explain unethical leader behavior and propose that the
probable outcomes derived from my model better explain bad leader behavior than
competing control-oriented models. The results of this inquiry underscore the transactional
and practical characteristics of leadership as a tool to help leaders manage their ethical
climates, improve business practices and management policies, understand the nature of
individual incentives, and capture transactional components of leader behavior.

Introduction

Ethical literature provides broad considerations for guiding individual and social interaction
and enhancing the general welfare of society. However, despite the maturity of the
scholarly ethical discipline, stories of leaders who exhibit unethical behavior are legion.
Such leaders exhibit such poor behavior for seemingly no logical reason; as prominent
business, government, and military leaders, they are all highly intelligent, well educated,
economically well off, and professionally accepted at the highest levels. These leaders
appear to have everything going for them, yet risk ethical misbehavior for relatively modest
gains. This observation presents an interesting puzzle: why do seemingly advantaged
leaders engage in poor ethical behavior when they already have such an advantage over
others? Moreover, what can leaders do to avoid such behavior?
In answering this puzzle, several explanations come to mind. Theories involving issues of
greed, competition, relative power differences at top echelons of responsibility, and mental
illness could offer simple explanations for potentially complicated behavior. However,
scholars offer other explanations that are more helpful but that remain altogether
unsatisfying. Park, Westphal, and Stern (2011) find that flattering comments from
subordinates to CEOs are causal in producing leader overconfidence and biased decisionmaking (Park, Westphal, & Stern, 2011). Park et al. find that high social status in leaders
exposes them to increasing levels of flattering comments and behavior (p. 261) which

inflates a leader’s sense of effective personal judgment and decreases a leader’s ability to
recognize poor performance or challenge ineffective strategies (p. 267). Park et al.’s
research suggests that leader behavior evolves over time so that leaders expect
unwavering conformity and fall victim to “believing their own press” where they lose the
ability to identify personal and performance-oriented shortcomings (p. 259).
Other scholars offer a simpler explanation for unethical leader behavior related to
competition and relative power differentials at top levels of leadership. Ludwig and
Longenecker (1993) noted that “ethical violations by upper managers are the by-product
of success, not of competitive pressures” which makes the aforementioned puzzle even
more intriguing (Ludwig & Longenecker, 1993, p. 265). According to the authors, ethical
misbehavior evolves as leaders become complacent, gain access to privileged information,
increase access to critical resources, and gain the ability to manipulate more favorable
outcomes (p. 265). In short, this theory provides an ego-centric approach to understanding
bad leader behavior, in contrast to the success-oriented theory proposed by Park et al., to
explain unethical leader behavior as involving more than the need to cut corners in an
increasingly competitive environment.
In the spirit of pragmatic ethics, I am proposing a more parsimonious explanation for
leader behavior. As scholars note, pragmatic ethics is about the process of decisionmaking such that “good ethical choices emerge through the use of inquiry” (Johnson,
2015), as well as “giving primacy to habits” which “carry the past into the present”
(LaFollette, 2013, p. 402). In understanding pragmatic ethics, a strategic choice model will
add to ethical leadership literature and provide a unique explanation for how ethical
considerations positively or negatively influence expected leader behavior. The results of
this inquiry underscore the transactional and practical characteristics of leadership as a
tool to help leaders manage their ethical climates, improve business practices and
management policies, understand the nature of individual incentives, and capture
transactional components of leader behavior.
This paper employs a deep-dive approach to understanding pragmatic ethics to uncover
how pragmatic ethical processes give primacy to more strategic ethical decision-making.
Furthermore, I employ the expectations of pragmatic ethics as utility variables that impact
the strategic nature of ethical decision-making and present a rational choice model to
uncover the conditions that incentivize ethical leader choices.

Pragmatic Ethics

Pragmatic ethics can positively influence strategic decision-making to underscore the
fundamental and continuing Deweyan notion that pragmatic ethics remain process-centric,
scientifically compatible, logical, and habit-driven (Johnson, 2015; LaFollette, 2013).
Furthermore, the literature of pragmatic ethics sufficiently uncovers a relationship
between ethical considerations and strategic choices that provide a nuanced
understanding of the variables that inform leader choices in ethically-challenging
environments.
Whitford (2002) challenges rational actor theory and its assumed “paradigmatic privilege”
by challenging the “portfolio” assumption that beliefs and desires are sufficient inputs for
strategic utility models (Whitford, 2002, p. 327). However, Whitford’s theory takes an overly
continuous view of pragmatism where “ends” of one choice become the “means” of the

next choice. In countering Whitford’s argument, a strategic choice model would reduce the
level of analysis from the systematic to the individual level and take a Bayesian approach
to understanding changes in decision-making over time. In pragmatic terms, lessons
learned through early leader choices impact the habits of leader choices in later decisions
(LaFollette, 2013).
Using a business-oriented model, Woiceshyn (2011) examines ethical decision-making
through the premise that “unethical decisions harm the decision makers themselves as
well as others, whereas ethical decision makers have the opposite effect” (Woiceshyn,
2011, p. 311). The author presents a theory of rational egoism where “reasoning
(conscious processing) and intuition (subconscious processing) interact through forming,
recalling, and applying moral principles necessary for long-term success in business” (p.
312). Woiceshyn also considers previous studies that found “managers employ the same
process when making decisions involving ethics as they do for any long-term decisions
affecting their companies” to imply that ethical choices can be more optimal than
unethical ones, which supports my research interests in rational ethics (p. 312).
Furthermore, Woiceshyn introduces causal factors for leader behavior to include audience
costs and the probability of getting caught; this “moral intensity” according to Trevino and
Youngblood, can be applied in a strategic choice model (p. 312).
In addressing LaFollette’s (2013) habit-forming aspects of pragmatic ethics, Caras and
Sandu (2014) argue for the “epistemic and pragmatic need and academic functioning of a
model embodied in ethical expertise” (Caras & Sandu, 2014, p. 142). For Caras and Sandu,
ethical expertise involves “rigorous training in moral philosophy” as “an imperative
condition for an ethics expert, precisely because his role is to provide professional
counseling to professionals whose expertise does not involve ethics exclusively” (p. 143).
Although Caras and Sandu fail to address the relative utility of expert counsel, they clarify
the distinction between performative and pragmatic expertise, which makes a valuable
connection between ethical counseling and utility.
Ali and Lin (2013) explore pragmatism in voter theory to identify when a rational person
would “incur the cost of voting, even when it is improbable that any one of them is pivotal”
(Ali & Lin, 2013. p. 73). This gives explanatory power to understanding the potential costs
of ethical behavior given inherent inefficiencies in achieving outcomes in intensely
competitive environments. Ali and Lin also offer a mathematical explanation for voter
behavior and add support for the rational approach by identifying how audience costs and
varying probabilities of being caught can impact the expected utility of leader choices. They
also imply that increased transparency can influence the above factors and add further
explanatory power to a strategic choice model to imply that ethical transparency might also
motivate ethical decision-making for a rational actor.
Pihlström (2013) investigates religious pragmatism as “a middle path option for those who
do not want to give up either their scientific worldview or their possible religious
sensibilities” (Pihlström, 2013, p. 27). This concept avoids the scientific implications of my
research into rational pragmatism by sidelining the strictness of empirical evidence toward
a “richer conception of evidence as something that can be had, or may be lacking, in the
'laboratory of life’“(p. 28). However, the author does suggest that pragmatism informs the

context of both religious and non-religious groups to “recognize someone or some group as
belonging to the same intellectual community of inquirers” (p. 34).
In a similar vein to Pihlström, Martela (2015) celebrates pragmatism as an alternative way
to understand the “clash between positivists and constructivist research methodologies in
organization studies” (Martela, 2015, p. 537). The positivist approach expresses the
current understanding of indigenous leadership and “general theories about organizations
and their members, which are reminiscent of the powerful universal laws found in natural
sciences” (p. 538). Likewise, the constructivist approach assumes that reality can be
“subjective constructions built from a variety of symbolic constructs” that lack the
universality of positivism. Pragmatism, as a third way, might help organizational research
to be “navigated in beneficial directions while avoiding both extremes” (p. 538). Martela
argues that pragmatism can add “ethicality and practical relevance into organizational
research” (p. 538) which supports a utility-based bargaining perspective where
pragmatism might explain the bargaining space between competing political actors (Bapat
& Kwon, 2015; Lake, 2010; Walter, 2009).
Farjoun, Ansell, and Boin (2015) draw upon organizational research to explore pragmatism
as “the problem-solving philosophy that builds on a rich and behaviorally plausible model
of human nature” (Farjoun, Ansell, & Boin, 2015, p. 1787). Interestingly, they also use
pragmatism to challenge both rational and structural models in favor of “a richer and more
realistic view of human behavior” to account for the individualistic, social, and complex
nature of individuals (p. 1788). However, pragmatism can serve as a theoretical bridge
that connects rationality to ethical considerations to support rational choice by providing
“effective desires [that] furnish us with our working capabilities” (p. 1790).
Kelley and Nahser (2014) argue that pragmatic thought is a pedagogical tool that
“prepares students to become responsible managers, to develop sustainable strategies,
and to be creators of shared value” (Kelley & Nahser, 2014, p. 631). This concept not only
supports the ethical value of the pragmatic ethical perspective as compared to
utilitarianism, Kantianism, altruism, and justice models but lends potential to rational
ethics (Johnson, 2015). They underscore the need to move beyond simple analysis to more
integrated systems thinking to identify how strategic leaders can combine rationality and
utility with improved ethical behavior (p. 636).
Baker and Schaltegger (2015) challenge common global responses to inequality and
environmental concerns by contrasting the “commercial and industrial activity by various
organizations aimed at meeting the financial demands,” against a “broader set of
stakeholders including governments, NGOs and the media” endeavoring to hold the former
accountable (p. 264). The authors not only tie together the rational influence that
pragmatism can have on strategic models but also suggest how “wicked problems”
challenge the creative and judgment-based abilities of decision-makers that can be proven
neither right nor wrong (Conklin, 2001, p. 8-9).
Morgan (2014) observes pragmatism from a social research perspective to challenge
pragmatism's association with mixed-methods scientific research. Specifically, Morgan
reinforces philosophical rather than qualitative characteristics of pragmatism “by moving
beyond the narrow approaches that reduce pragmatism to practicality” (Morgan, 2014, p.
1045). Similarly, Ali and Lin’s (2013) explanation of the impact of audience costs on voting

behavior (p. 75) is underscored by Morgan’s pragmatic explanation for understanding
actions and choices as “not just what researchers do but why they do things the ways they
do” (Morgan, 2014, p. 1051). Although Morgan challenges some of the scientific
assumptions of pragmatism, the potential for ethical considerations to inform choices
remains valid.
The scholarly perspectives outlined in the literature of pragmatic ethics define a gap in the
ethical literature that remains insufficiently covered in rational actor theory and reinforces
the potential for pragmatic ethics to inform utility-based strategic decision-making. In the
following section, I explore the potential for pragmatic ethical considerations to impact
ethical choices following the Deweyan aspects of inquiry against the backdrop of a
theoretical strategic choice model. In taking Johnson’s (2013) words to task, I use a
rational choice model to borrow from the “same strategies as solving other dilemmas” in
providing a unique, imaginative, and creative understanding of ethical behavior (p. 167).

A Theory of Rational Pragmatism

The literature of pragmatic ethics underscores the connection between ethical
considerations and rational choices. To support the theoretical expectations of pragmatic
ethics, a stylized strategic choice game can explain the impact of ethical considerations on
a leader’s rational utility and can uncover how the utility of ethically superior choices
compare to less ethical ones. Rational choice theory is based on the primary assumption
that “a decision-maker chooses the best action according to her preferences, among all
actions available to her” (Osborne, 2003, p. 4). Furthermore, the terms “utility” and “payoff”
reflect only the decider’s preferences, regardless of “the nature of her likes and dislikes”
(p. 4). In presenting a rational choice model, I expose the theoretical impact of multiple
factors that influence a decision-maker’s overall payoff and expand on the benefits and
costs that remain constant across competing choices. Additional factors in the model
capture potential for savings benefits and audience costs to incentivize unethical leader
behavior.
The game begins with a Leader’s (L) choice between two mutually exclusive decisions that
compete between an ethical (E) and unethical choice (~E) as described in Figure 1 below.
The payoff for E is expressed as a function of benefits (B) minus costs (C) where the
difference represents the overall payoff (B – C). Likewise, the payoff for ~E considers the
same B and C but also incorporates other factors that affect the overall utility of ~E. For
purposes of simplicity, this model only considers savings (S), defined as benefits that
follow from unethical choices that include variations in B, reductions in C or other
shortcuts so that the payoff of (B – C + S) > (B – C). Without the value of S, the two choices
would be equal and L would have no incentive to ever play ~E. However, leader behavior
suggests that L often does play ~E, implying that in some cases ~E > E. For the purposes
of understanding this model, it is assumed that B and C are identical for each choice, the
goal of L is to maximize the value of the total payoff, and the choices are mutually
exclusive and exhaustive. The model’s usefulness serves only to explain the impact of the
ethical variable on a leader's choice such that, ceteris paribus, all other factors are
constant.

Figure 1. Ethical Choices for Leader Decisions
E

(B – C)

L
~E (P)(B – C – C*) + (1 – P)(B – C +S)
Adding to the complexity of the model are the ideas presented by Ali and Lin (2013) where
the probability of being exposed for engaging in bad leader behavior adds to the utility of a
rational choice. For ~E, there is a probability of getting caught (P) and not getting caught (1
– P), where the choices are exhaustive and where P + (1 – P) =1.
Furthermore, the model captures the negative effect of getting caught in the form of
audience costs (C*) so that (B – C) > (B – C – C*). Incorporating S and C* into the model
serves to ensure specific conditions that affect L’s utility; not getting caught playing ~E has
higher utility than E such that (B – C + S) > (B – C), while getting caught playing ~E has a
lower utility than E such that (B – C) > (B – C – C*). For choice E, there are no negative
ethical considerations and L neither worries about P nor C*, as both P and C*=0.
In calculating the expected utility of both choices (E and ~E), L is expected to calculate the
“utility for each possible outcome times the probability of that outcome’s occurring if a
given action is chosen” (Morrow, 1994, p. 350). Under the assumptions of rational choice
theory, expected utility (EU) drives the decision- maker’s preferences (Cohen & Cohen,
2008; Morrow, 1994; Osborne, 2003). If the EU of L’s choices are such that EU(E) > EU(~E),
a rational L should choose E. If the conditions are such that EU(~E) > EU(E), then a rational
L should choose to play ~E. The following summarizes the EU for both E and ~E:
EU(E) = (P)(B – C) + (1 - P)(B – C) =
= (0)(B – C) + (1)(B – C) =
= (B – C)
EU(~E) = (P)(B – C – C*) + (1 – P)(B – C +S)
Therefore, to answer the research question proposed, ethical considerations can impact
the overall payoff of a rational choice model so that L should choose to play E if it can be
determined that EU(E) > EU(~E), given the guaranteed payoff of (B – C) compared to the
probability of getting caught and the risk of getting a payoff of (B – C – C*). In the interest
of simplicity, solving the equation (B – C) > (P)(B – C – C*) + (1 – P)(B – C +S), reveals the
potential for rational ethics to be true given that audience costs (C*) meet the following
criteria:
C* >

𝑆𝑆(1−𝑃𝑃)
𝑃𝑃

This means that L is likely to choose the most ethical choice when audience costs (C*)
outweigh the benefits of savings (S) based on L’s probability of getting caught. Using
variable probabilities of P, and holding the value of S constant, the equation reveals the
expected relationship between getting caught and leader behavior at the extremes. When

P is 0, L should play ~E and when P is 1, L should play E. However, outside of a strict
binomial distribution for P, the results are more dynamic.
Modeling alternative values for P such that 0 > P > 1, we find the value that C* becomes
inversely proportional to P as P 1, meaning that the threshold for audience costs to
encourage ethical behavior drops drastically as P increases to 1 and that C* > 0 always
remains true. However, when the probability of getting caught is low (0 > P > 1/2), EU(E) >
EU(~E) will only be true when C* is significantly higher than in cases where P > 1/2. The
graph in Figure 2 illustrates that the relationship between increasing P and monotonically
decreasing C* thresholds. When the probability of getting caught is below P = 0.5,
audience costs thresholds must be significantly higher than when the probability of getting
caught is high.
Figure 2. The Effect of Increasing P on C* (S is constant)
Increasing P on C*
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Furthermore, when P is uncertain (P =1/2), the threshold for C* to impact leader choices
is already approaching C* > 0. However, the model also indicates an expected relationship
between C* and S such that L will only play E as long as C* > S when P=1/2. In Figure 3,
when the value of S is increasing while P is held constant at low, medium, and high
probabilities, we see that audience cost thresholds increase at varying rates. When the
probability of getting caught is low (Low P), the threshold for C* increases linearly so that
C* >S and C* > 0 is true for all values of S. Thus, even when the probability of getting
caught is low, the C* threshold creates conditions where EU(E) > EU(~E) and L remains
expected to play E. When the probability of getting caught is uncertain at P=1/2 (Mid P),
the ratio of C* to S remains fixed at 1 to 1 so that C* is never greater than S. At this point,
EU(E) cannot surpass EU(~E) and L remains incentivized to play ~E. Lastly, when P is high
(High P), the threshold for C* remains near but greater than 0 so that L remains
incentivized to play E.

Figure 3. The Effect of Increasing S on Low, Medium, and High P on C*
Increasing S on C*
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However, this solution becomes more complicated when considering the potential for S to
be increasingly high. In conditions where P is uncertain and the value of S  ∞, the
assumption that audience costs remain greater than savings becomes problematic. In fact,
negative publicity in a media-driven world could have a paradoxical effect on the value of
audience costs so that decision makers are rewarded for unethical behavior. Some
decision makers gain popularity following unethical choices, which serve to discount the
value of C* in any realistic manner. This model does not explain cases of extreme savings
or diminishing audience costs, which would require significant modifications for the utility
of E and ~E in such cases.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to help leaders and managers understand pragmatic ethical
considerations from a rational perspective, given the understanding that pragmatism
provides a more process-oriented, scientifically compatible, and habit developing ethical
construct than other more normative ethical considerations. Using this model as a tool,
leaders should be able to limit unethical decision making by understanding rational
incentives, anticipating potential bad behavior, and improving policies and practices where
bad ethical choices occur. Despite lacking a “normative core” pragmatic ethics provides
leaders with an opportunity to incorporate ethical behavior into increasingly uncertain
environments (Johnson, 2015). That said, the normative disadvantage of pragmatism
could potentially limit pragmatism’s use in real-world situations where leaders are known
to fall short in demonstrating ethical behavior.
In contrast to other research that suggests leaders evolve into bad ethical decision making
due to flattering comments and unrealistic expectations for success (Ludwig &
Longenecker, 1993; Park et al., 2011), the question of how strategic choices influences
rational leader behavior helps to better understand one aspect of negative human
behavior. Does the nature of human behavior reveal that “cheaters never win,” or does

leader behavior actually suggest the darker reality that “nice guys finish last?” Through the
extant literature of pragmatic and rational ethics, the expected value of rational choices
can help understand leader ethical behavior.
By modeling the rational incentives that influence leader choices, the rational model
uncovers how varying probabilities of getting caught, combined with audience costs and
savings benefits, contribute to unethical leader behavior. Likewise, the model supports the
idea that ethical behavior, especially in uncertain conditions, can remain rational as long
as audience costs remaining sufficiently high. That said, the potential for the savings
associated with unethical choices to become increasingly high makes the assumption that
audience costs can keep up with savings to positively impact leader behavior problematic.
At some point, audience costs could reach a maximum value while savings benefits
continue to rise and this model does not claim to explain behavior at such extremes.
Lastly, the model provides an alternative explanation for unethical leader behavior at
senior levels that goes beyond flattery and clarifies the findings of Ludwig and
Longenecker. The model adds a practical dimension for enabling leaders to understand
the role that personal incentives play in managing ethical climates from a transactional
perspective. Instead of ascribing a leader’s bad behavior to an increasing belief in the
ability to “manipulate outcomes,” my model’s transactional approach to suggest that a
leader’s bad behavior follows largely from the expected probability of getting caught.
Policies that favor transparency and increase the probability of exposing unethical choices
can help leaders better leverage audience costs to encourage ethical behavior. Although
the two explanations share similarities, Ludwig and Longenecker’s explanation relies upon
an internal locus of control over outcomes, while the rational model suggests an external
locus of control predicated on the stochastic nature of probability. By switching the causal
variable from individual control to random probability, leaders might better understand that
getting caught is less a function of skill and more of a function of inevitability over time.
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